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Abstract 
The concept of uneven and combined development (U&CD) interprets dynamic historical 
change and comparative geographical differentiation in terms of the co-existence of tendencies 
towards differentiation and equalization of the conditions of production, consumption, 
distribution and exchange, deriving from capital accumulation and political multiplicity. U&CD 
entails a conception of the global system as a constellation of interdependent, national 
institutional configurations and interests that shape international/national/regional trends. To 
explain geographies of industrialization and urbanization and current trends towards a pluri-
centric world, U&CD requires however a specification of the underlying causal mechanisms, 
examined in economic geography, international relations and developmental state theories. 
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Uneven and combined development 
The crisis of neo-liberal globalization, the progressive slowdown of the economies of the 
North and of Japan that led global economic growth up to the 1970s, the end of the third wave of 
multiparty representative democracy, the rise of new powers with distinctive social models and 
the erosion of a unipolar world and Western global leadership are a set of interconnected trends. 
These trends are fundamentally changing the macro-geographies (Michael Dunford et al., 2016; 
Jamie Peck, 2016) of the world and require a rethinking of the ideas that are used to understand 
international, national, regional and urban development. 
A central argument of this article is that these macro-geographies are consequences of 
uneven and combined development (U&CD), making U&CD an important overarching concept. 
U&CD derives from geographically and historically differentiated processes of industrialization 
and urbanization and the underlying mechanisms through which infrastructures, jobs, people, 
income and wealth are concentrated in hierarchical systems of interconnected city-regions. These 
underlying mechanisms have been examined in numerous studies of modernization, dependency, 
modes of production, world systems, developmental states and economic/urban and regional 
geography (for recent accounts see Haggard, 2015; Makki, 2015; Sheppard, 2016). 
Analysis of these processes, it will be argued, should draw on a twofold conception of the 
evolving global system as (1) a set of processes of capital accumulation, unfolding at a variety of 
scales and (2) an assemblage/constellation of interacting and asymmetrically integrated/inter-
connected national institutional configurations and interests that shape economic trends and can 
result in ‘tectonic spatial shifts’(see also Aoyama, 2016) These economic, political and cultural 
drivers are associated with specific mechanisms of differentiation and equalization of the 
conditions of production, distribution, consumption and exchange (see also Smith, 1984), whose 
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relative weight and character shape comparative development. In capitalist societies 
enterprises/institutions/countries that are less developed are pressured and able to appropriate 
technical and social gains from the more advanced. These gains are combined with existing 
conditions, jumping over intermediate steps, yet generating new contradictions. Outcomes 
depend on institutional/governance capacities and the degree of support from/ability to resist 
more advanced rivals. Outcomes involve an unfolding combination/articulation of different 
stages of development/modes of production and differentiated historical pathways to 
modernization (geographical variety). 
To develop this argument the next section will outline Leon Trotsky's original concept of 
U&CD and its recent impact on international relations. Sections 2 and 3 will present a set of 
stylised macroeconomic geographies, identifying the current map of U&CD and recent and long-
term trends/modernization paths. To explain these geographies of global divergence and 
convergence, the remaining sections will examine mechanisms driving the reproduction of 
inequality (uneven development) and contender catch-up (combined development). Sections 4 
and 5 draws on economic geography and economic history to examine the roles of capital 
accumulation, savings and investment. Section 6 draws on recent research especially in 
international relations to consider the role of political multiplicity and governance capacity as 
drivers of differentiation, equalization and comparative development. Section 7 concludes. 
1 Uneven and combined development (U&CD) 
Recently there has been a renewal of interest in several fields of research in U&CD. The 
concept/law was introduced by Trotsky (1928) who used it to explain the ‘peculiarities’ of the 
economic, political and cultural development of Russia before the 1917 Bolshevik revolution 
(Trotsky, 1930). More specifically, it served, first, to criticise stages views of historical 
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development. Stage theories claimed that less developed countries should undergo a ‘democratic’ 
revolution and, only after a phase of capitalist development, a socialist revolution, and that less 
developed countries will repeat completely the processes of industrialization and modernization 
of advanced countries. Second, it helped explain Tsarist Russia’s peculiar combination of state-
promoted modern industry, a small industrial working class and a vast rural peasantry.  
For Trotsky Russian backwardness was an expression of the law of unevenness, which he 
later argued governed the whole history of mankind, explaining ‘the extreme diversity in the 
levels attained, and the extraordinary unevenness in the rate of development of the different 
sections of mankind during the various epochs’ (Trotsky, 1928, Part 1(4)). 
Trotsky argued however that there is a related law of combined development. ‘Capitalism 
finds various sections of mankind at different stages of development, each with its profound 
internal contradictions. … In contrast to the economic systems which preceded it, capitalism 
inherently and constantly aims at economic expansion … and equalizes the economic and 
cultural levels of the most progressive and the most backward countries’. Backward countries 
were compelled to follow after advanced countries (‘the whip of external necessity’), but do not 
‘take things in the same order. The privilege of historic backwardness … compels the adoption 
of whatever is ready in advance of any specified date, skipping a whole series of intermediate 
stages’. The outcome of this dialectic of compulsion and privilege was ‘the drawing together of 
different stages of the journey, a combination of the separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with 
contemporary forms’(Trotsky, 1928, Part 1(4)). 
The most striking recent recovery of the concept of U&CD has occurred in the field of 
international relations where it serves as a foundation stone of geopolitical economy, non-realist 
accounts of the existence of a multiplicity of states and socially-grounded interpretations of state 
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systems, contemporary imperialism and geopolitical and geo-economic conflict/co-operation 
(see Allinson & Anievas, 2009; Callinicos, 2009; Cooper, 2013; Desai, 2015; Harvey, 2003; 
Kiely, 2012; J. Rosenberg, 2010)  
This research is important in that it draws attention to the causal role of state actions and 
inter-state relations and counters the exaggerations of 1990s theories of globalization which 
suggested that increasing interconnectedness was leading to the replacement of the sovereign 
state system by a multi-layered, multilateral system of 'global governance'.  
More fundamentally, the concept of development as uneven/differentiated and 
intrinsically interactive grounds world history, world geography and international relations in 
multiple social structures and agency, and grounds the development of individual societies not in 
their internal structures and agents alone but also in their interconnectedness with other societies. 
U&CD accordingly undermines traditional social theories and Euro-centric concepts of 
development and modernity, as it recognises the role of external and non-western sources of 
internal change (Anievas & Matin, 2016). In the words of Rosenberg: ‘all societies coexist with 
and interact with others, and … this [interaction] super-adds a lateral ﬁeld of causality over and 
above the ‘domestic’ determinations arising from each and every one of the participant societies 
(Callinicos & Rosenberg, 2008: 88) 
. Rosenberg has argued that U&CD is an abstract universal category relating to the 
differentiated peopling of the earth and exploitation of first and second nature, the interaction of 
different communities and political multiplicity. Critics argue that conceptualizations of U&CD 
should be more sensitive to the specific mechanisms associated with different types of social 
order (see Davidson, 2009; Kiely, 2012), or that the distinct causal repercussions of inter-societal 
competition are only fully activated under capitalism (Allinson & Anievas, 2009). 
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In urban and regional research uneven development received sustained attention in the 
late 1970s and 1980s (M. Dunford, 1979; M. F. Dunford & Perrons, 1983; Harvey, 1982; 
Lipietz, 1977; Massey, 1984; Smith, 1984). Recently, the concept of ‘combined and uneven 
development’ (sic) has re-emerged (Hadjimichalis & Hudson, 2014; Hudson, 2016; Jamie Peck, 
2017; Rowthorn, 2010). The early analyses of the uneven production of nature and industrial and 
urban space have however much to learn from subsequent urban and regional research and 
especially from the international relations tradition: although spatial interdependence was 
highlighted, development was seen as combined and uneven rather than vice-versa, and these 
studies failed to appreciate the significance of political multiplicity. 
For Trotsky, combined ‘grows out of the first [uneven development] and completes it’. 
(Trotsky, cited in Davidson, 2012, 295). As Anievas and Nisancioglu (2015, 45) argue, 
‘combination … refers to the ways in which the internal relations of any given society are 
determined by their interactive relations with other developmentally differentiated societies’. In 
polities that are less developed these interactions are sources of constraint and 
innovation/creativity. Material and non-material aspects of more advanced societies are grafted 
on and combined, in the absence of the social relations from which they emerged, with internal 
social relations to produce and reproduce in ever-changing forms ‘amalgamated socio-political 
institutions, socio-economic systems, ideologies and material practices’ (Anievas & Matin, 2016, 
45) which in turn react upon more developed societies (Matin, 2013). These differing 
combinations of ‘native’ and ‘foreign’, ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’, ‘new’ and ‘old’, ‘modern’ 
and ‘traditional’ relate to economics, politics and culture, and make development interactively 
multi-linear and geographically differentiated. Methodologically therefore U&CD theorizes not 
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just general mechanisms governing social life (necessity) but also the necessity of multiple 
outcomes (contingency) and the openness of processes of development (Cooper, 2013). 
In international relations these ideas are employed mainly to examine state formation and 
geopolitical rivalries and conflicts. What this research lacks however is a developed theorization 
and detailed empirical analysis of differential industrialization, urbanization and connectivity and 
of the role of capital accumulation: of in other words the objects of urban and regional research 
which can themselves be examined in the light of U&CD. For these reasons there are important 
potential synergies between these two fields of study, to which this article seeks to make a small 
contribution by examining geographies of longue durée industrialization and urbanization and 
contender catch-up in the light of U&CD (Rolf, 2015). 
2 U&CD: some outline macroeconomic geographies 
At present wide geographical disparities in labour productivity and output per head 
prevail, while growth involves phases of relatively sustained growth punctuated by phases of 
instability and crisis. 
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Figure 1 GDP, GDP per head and population in 2014 by major world regions and 
countries, Source: elaborated from The Conference Board (2015) 
 
In 2014, measured in per capita GDP in 1990 PPP dollars (Figure 1), there were wide 
differences between the western offshoots of North America, Australia and New Zealand 
($31,599), the Asian Tiger economies ($26,406), Japan ($22,700) and Western Europe ($20,964) 
and the rest of the world (ROW). The Gulf oil states averaged $9,233. In sub-Saharan Africa 
other than South Africa ($5,678) and Nigeria ($2,119), per capita GDP stood at just $1,205. 
China ($9,966) and India ($3,975) had moderate to relatively low levels of income per head. 
With 1.26 billion inhabitants, however, China was the largest economy in the world, with a GDP 
of 13,590 billion, compared with 10,424 billion for the US and 8,772 billion  (8,772)for Western 
Europe. 
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Figure 2 Average annual rates of growth, 1950-2014. Source elaborated from The 
Conference Board (2015) 
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This geography is a result of long-term processes. Considering the years since 1950 
(Figure 2), growth rates were generally fastest in the 1950-73 Golden Age. After the Second 
World War, Western and Southern Europe grew rapidly. In each subsequent economic cycle 
Western European growth rates were less than one-half of Golden Age rates and close to zero in 
2008-14. GDP growth of the western offshoots also slowed down. Communist Eastern Europe 
grew rapidly in 1960-73. A rapid transition to capitalism in 1989-97 saw output decline on 
average at 5.1% per year. In 1997 and 2014 output stood at just 66.2% and 132% of its 1989 
level. China’s growth averaged 8.9% per year from 1979-2010 and is one of the reasons for the 
growth of Asia at 5.4, 6.1 and 6.1% per year in the three cycles from 1989 until 2014. In those 
years, the growth first of Japan and then of the Tiger economies slowed down markedly. In Latin 
America, sub-Saharan Africa and MENA, relatively high growth rates in 1950-73 gave way to 
much slower growth in 1973-97. In Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and formerly Communist 
Eastern Europe, slowdown/decline reflected the implementation of Washington Consensus 
measures. Many of these countries progressively lost competitiveness in world markets, and 
some came to depend on natural resource/food exports. In growing rapidly Japan, the Four 
Tigers, China, India and Vietnam violated virtually all of the rules of neoliberalism. 
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Figure 3 World shares of GDP, 1500-2014. Source: elaborated from Maddison (2003), 
The Conference Board (2015) 
 
The roots of these disparities lie further in the past in the Great and Little Divergence. The Great Divergence in GDP per capita dates from the start of the Industrial Revolution and the subsequent wave of colonial and imperial expansion. International inequality 
increased very strongly from 1820 until 1950, when the share of world GDP of Western Europe 
and Western offshoots peaked (Figure 3). From 1950 until 1990 between-country inequality 
grew more slowly from a Theil coefficient of 0.51 to 0.54, after which it declined rapidly to 0.26 
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in 2014 (albeit with a brief increase after the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis) due to relatively rapid 
emerging economy growth (van Zanden, Baten, Foldvari, & van Leeuwen, 2014).1  
Figure 4 First and second industrial divides. Source: elaborated from data from (Bairoch, 
1997; UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2016) 
 
                                                 
1 In 1910-50 and especially in 1950-80 intra-country social inequality declined due to an egalitarian revolution associated with the rise 
of Communism and the Golden Age decline in income inequality in Europe and the US. After 1980 within-country social inequality increased 
strongly. 
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These trends in global inequality reflect the evolving geography of industrialization and 
urbanization. Before the industrial revolution, Western Europe dominated a set of commercial 
empires around the Atlantic, Indian and Asian Oceans, while Asia was the centre of world 
manufacturing (Figure 4). With the onset of the industrial revolution, a number of regions in 
Western Europe emerged as centres of modern manufacturing, from which economic 
development diffused to the rest of Europe and white-settler countries. Of them the US pioneered 
mass production, and replaced Great Britain as the hegemonic global power. This polarization of 
the geography of industry started to change with rise of Japan and the Asian Tigers, and the 
Fordist crisis of the 1970s which opened the way to financialization and the hollowing out of 
advanced capitalist country manufacturing (Michael Dunford, 2005, pp. 156-157), a global 
shift/offshoring of manufacturing to emerging economies (Dicken, 2010) and eventually debt-
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financed trade imbalances in western countries. Although industrial movement at first involved 
unskilled manufacturing rather than product design and marketing, export-oriented Asian 
economies progressively moved up the value chain. 
Figure 5 Take-off and relatively sustained growth up to 2014. Source: elaborated from 
data from Maddison (2003), The Conference Board (2015) 
 
In the last 250 years what distinguishes economically advanced economies from the 
ROW is sustained growth. In Great Britain the growth of a number of industrial regions and the 
country’s commercial, financial, political and cultural capital made it the first modern industrial 
nation (Figure 5). Modern economic growth started some 200-230 years ago. Growth spread to 
other regions in Europe and white settler territories. After the Meiji Restoration Japan embarked 
on modern industrial growth. Japanese growth accelerated after defeat in the Second World War, 
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enabling it to join the group of advanced capitalist economies in the 1980s. The Soviet Union 
grew rapidly from the 1920s, and after massive Second World War destruction and population 
loss. Growth however petered out in the 1970s due to the ageing of the fixed capital stock and 
the inability of the centrally planned economy to replace retiring equipment and infrastructure 
(Popov, 2014). In the 1960s growth spread from Japan to four small Asian Tiger economies. 
Until the 1960s, the economies that acquired, adopted and developed advanced technologies and 
achieved relatively high levels of affluence were few in number and small in size. Although 
growth spurts occurred, and islands/enclaves of modernization emerged, most economies could 
not sustain high growth rates and remained relatively backward until the rise of China and India. 
In each case growth involved the transformation of predominantly agrarian and rural into 
industrial and urban societies. These transformations generate profound dislocation and conflict 
as rural populations are uprooted, agricultural productivity increases, cities grow and new 
technologies and ways of life are generalised (combined development). As Figure 5 shows, the 
speed of these changes has accelerated. Achieving a five-fold increase in initial real GDP per 
capita took Great Britain more than 160 years, Germany more than 108, the US more than 100 
and Japan more than 75. Similar increases took just over 22 years in South Korea, 28 in Hong 
Kong, 24 in Taiwan and 26 in Singapore. Mainland China has so far taken just over 25 years, 
transforming the lives of some one-fifth of the world's population, compressing what had taken 
centuries into a few decades, and carrying it out on an unprecedented scale. 
The gap that opened up with the Great Divergence was itself however laid upon an earlier 
gap, that had opened up in the early modern period, with the little Divergence between the most 
advanced parts of Europe - Flanders, Holland, and England – and the ROW. The ROW included 
not just China and other parts of Asia where the real wages of labourers were close to 
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subsistence levels (Allen, 2009) but also Eastern and Southern Europe where Spanish and Italian 
GDP per head had gone into long-term decline from 1500. 
3 The regional foundations of national development 
An examination of these changes in the map of economic development plays a significant 
role in regional and urban research, as these national differences are results of underling 
regional/urban differences, interregional and international relationships (commerce, investment, 
migration), and national institutional configurations. The Little Divergence between the North 
Sea area and the rest of Europe was regional/urban in character: 
In the 14th-15th centuries Flanders formed the urban core of this 
economic system – and England its ‘periphery’. In the 16th century Brabant 
(and in particular Antwerp) took over the role of being the core. After 1585 the 
urban centre moved to Holland, a switch that resulted in the Dutch ‘Golden 
Age’ of the 17th century. After about 1650 London gradually replaced 
Amsterdam as the central hub in the commercial network of North-Western 
Europe, and the urban core switched to England (de Pleijt & van Zanden, 
2013, page 2) 
This divergence was driven in part by external factors. In 1620 Francis Bacon stated that 
the modern world was marked off from the past by the impact of three innovations (gunpowder, 
the printing press and the magnetic compass) which did more than any empire or religion to lift 
Europe out of the Dark Ages (Justin Rosenberg, 2016). All three were transferred to Europe from 
China. Other external drivers also played a part (Anievas & Nisancioglu, 2015). 
The subsequent industrial revolution occurred in a number of regional economies. In 
Great Britain in 1760-1800, the most important innovative changes occurred in about ten small 
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islands of industrialization near localised resource deposits or in areas of traditional industry: 
Cornwall, Shropshire, North Wales, upland Derbyshire, Tyneside, the Clyde Valley, South 
Staffordshire, the West Riding of Yorkshire and South Lancashire. Strong national performance 
was a result of the growth of a number of strong regional economies, although their growth 
ruined traditional industrial areas (such as Irish linen in the 1820s contributing to male migration 
to Britain and the US and depopulation). National structures and trends are underpinned 
therefore by development within countries that is also uneven and combined. 
Figure 6 Prefecture-level GDP in China, 2013. Source: elaborated from data from NBS, 
various years, 
 
Figure 6 plots the GDP in 2103 of 4 Municipalities and 337 Prefecture level entities 
(essentially city regions containing smaller County-levels cities, Townships and Villages) in 
China. In 2013 five cities in Eastern China (Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and 
Tianjin) out of 341 accounted for 10.9% of GDP. The top 20, which included two cities in 
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Western China (Chongqing and Chengdu) and three in Central China (Wuhan, Changsha and 
Zhengzhou), accounted for 32.2%, while 48 accounted for 50.4%. As throughout the world, 
wealth creation is strongly concentrated spatially in a relatively small number of city regions. 
Variations in GDP and GDP per capita differ enormously (and are subject to constant 
change). In 2013, in the case of these Chinese city regions, GDP varied by 1173:1 whereas GDP 
per capita varied by 5.6:1, simply because the population was also concentrated in cities/mega 
cities. These differences in labour productivity and per capita income and in the underlying 
geography of economic activities and population are also results of development that is uneven 
and combined. 
4 Capital accumulation and the differentiation and equalization of the conditions of 
production, distribution, consumption and exchange 
The evidence presented in the last two sections points to the constancy of differences in 
development in the double sense of the unequal development of different parts of the surface of 
the earth (synchronic, geographical differences in labour productivity and income per head) and 
of change at varying speeds of relative positions (diachronic historical differences). In this sense 
there is a law of uneven development. Such a law is however essentially an empirical 
generalization as it does not fully specify causal mechanisms. Adding the idea that development 
is combined draws attention to the ways dynamic interdependence/connectedness near-compels 
enterprises/areas that are less developed to emulate more advanced rivals and reduce differences, 
articulating the old and the new. Again, however, the underlying causal mechanisms require 
specification. 
As Lewis (1954) indicated, ‘the central problem in the theory of economic development 
is to understand the process by which a community which was previously saving and investing 4 
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or 5% of its national income or less, converts itself into the economy where voluntary saving is 
running at about 12 to 15% of national income or more …[showing that] the central fact of 
economic development is capital accumulation’. And as (Feinstein, 1981) noted, without an 
ability ‘both to organise the process of production so as to incorporate the new techniques in 
appropriate assets, and to save a sufficient sum to provide the finance for those acquiring capital 
goods … [a society would not be able] to benefit from technical progress however readily the 
knowledge might be available. In this sense at least the process of capital accumulation must still 
occupy a central role in any explanation of the growth of output and productivity.’ 
Capital assets includes tangible productive capital, intangible human capital and natural 
capital (reminding us of the importance of the metabolism of humanity with nature). In capitalist 
modes of production natural and productive assets assume the form of private property. Capital 
itself is value in motion: money capital is advanced to purchase means of production and labour 
power, which transforms purchased inputs into products that are subsequently offered for sale 
(Harvey, 2016). The surpluses realised if products are sold for more than the sum advanced are 
in part reinvested, generating an outward spiral in which rapid increases in the production of 
goods and services create a need for increasing consumption (which itself depends on the way 
income is distributed) to recover costs and value added (see also Cox, 2008). 
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Figure 7 Drivers of urbanization and economic development. 
 
Growth and development themselves involve two inter-related longer-term processes of 
structural change (Kuznets, 1955): the transformation of societies that are predominantly 
agricultural and rural into societies in which (1) industry and services are the main sources of 
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output and employment and (2) the population is predominantly urban. Throughout most of 
human history these processes unfolded slowly, with many reverses. 
These historically and geographically differentiated processes of industrialization and 
urbanization are a result of drivers of U&CD and in particular of differentiated investments in 
the conversion of land from rural to urban use and from one urban use to another, in urban and 
rural infrastructure, in agricultural restructuring to increase productivity and commercialised 
food production, in export-oriented ‘basic’ industries and ‘non-basic services for the residential 
population and visitors, and their impacts on rural-urban migration and population change 
(Figure 7). The specific ways in which these drivers operate and evolve depend on their 
geographical and economic, political/institutional and cultural settings (see, for example, 
Campolina Diniz & Vieira, 2016; Liu, Dunford, Song, & Chen, 2016; Turok, 2016). In capitalist 
societies most involve the investment of financial resources with a view to creating income 
streams permitting cost recovery, the repayment of credits and the realization of profits.  
In urban and regional research these processes are examined in a wide range of theories. 
All however presuppose the existence of savings and investment. In capitalist societies the main 
starting point is the (agricultural, industrial, commercial, real estate and financial) enterprise, its 
profit, growth and upgrading strategies (an M-C-M´ circuit) and its changing relationships with 
its evolving external environment. These strategies give rise to social, technical and spatial 
divisions of labour (STSDL) (Massey, 1984) that increase productivity and differentiate and 
equalize the conditions of production, distribution, consumption and exchange. 
Differentiation itself derives from growth and accumulation (and requires new modes of 
integration/co-ordination). Growth is a strategic objective not simply as a result of choice but due 
to the existence of competitors and the need (‘the whip of external necessity’) to grow/adjust to 
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survive. Achieving this objective may involve introducing a new good or a new quality of a 
known good, a new method of production or mode of management or a new source of labour, 
opening up of a new market, conquering a new source of raw materials or semi-finished good 
and/or establishing new organizational models. All are examples of innovation, deriving from 
dedicated research and development or from spill-overs of knowledge and capabilities. 
Outcomes include investment in new plant and equipment, increases in the scale of 
production (that spread fixed costs over a large volume of output), a more detailed division of 
labour (that increases productivity as it permit the introduction and use of machines, generating 
increasing returns) and an increased variety of intermediate and final goods. Geographically, 
scale/scope, agglomeration and urbanization economies result in the concentration of 
investments in places that are accessible and have large and extensive markets. In phases of 
growth, this increased differentiation of industrial activities leads to cumulative and rapid 
increases in productivity and strengthens the competitiveness of certain firms/regions (especially 
if reinforced by differences in the elasticity of demand for their products). These 
enterprises/areas grow rapidly and, aided by revolutions in transport, communications and 
connectivity, press for greater inter-regional and international integration to secure raw materials, 
cheaper inputs including labour and access to new or expanded markets, exposing other 
enterprises and parts of the world to greater competition. 
Competition, however, gives rise to equalization tendencies. To remain profitable and 
survive, enterprises/areas that are left behind must adjust/copy/adapt, introducing new products 
and/or technologies, securing cheaper inputs or entering new markets so as to match/surpass their 
competitors, rivals and adversaries. Failure implies relative decline/bankruptcy and is reflected in 
company/industry life cycles. Success enables survival, and can involve catch-up or even 
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overtaking, perhaps as a result of latecomer advantage and major shifts in technology and 
industrial structure. Geographically, moreover, there are limits to concentration with dispersal 
and equalization arising from higher living, wage and land costs in developed areas (Myrdal, 
1957). 
Trends in industrial development (and in urbanization) depend on the relative strength of 
these two sets of forces. Generally speaking, capital accumulation gives rise to greater socio-
economic inequality reflected in the concentration and centralization of capital and increased 
income inequality. Geographically, divergence (uneven development) often prevailed for two 
reasons. First, companies in some areas introduced more complex divisions of labour and new 
technologies sooner and more extensively than those in others. Second, structural and 
geographical asymmetries emerged: different areas specialized in sectors (agriculture, industry, 
or finance) with different returns to scale and demand elasticities or different functional roles 
(research, design, management, manufacture, or marketing) that generated differences in per 
capita value added. Many less developed areas found themselves dependent, for example, on 
primary goods which do not yield dynamic increases in productivity in the way that 
manufacturing does, increasing disparities. 
The completion of these circular movements of capital (M-C-M´) often encounters limits. 
These movements can spiral out of control giving rise to crises of different durations, reflecting 
underlying contradictions/disequilibria and changing secular trends. These chronological trends 
are also instances of U&CD. In economically developed parts of the world, for example, secular 
stagnation set in from the 1970s (Figure 2) due to a decline in the expected profitability of 
further investment after a long period of capital accumulation. To offset this downturn, a number 
of measures were adopted (an attack on wages and trade unions, the integration of political and 
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economic power, the privatization of public assets, the accumulation of public and private debt, 
asset inflation and financialization). The interplay of these crisis tendencies and counter-
tendencies generated several waves of expansion followed by severe contractions, at first in 
some peripheral parts of the world, in Japan, in South-east Asia and finally in the core of the 
world economy (Streeck, 2016). 
5 Inequality, capital accumulation and U&CD 
In the last section ideas from economic geography were brought together to identify 
mechanisms through which capital accumulation causes a constant differentiation and 
equalization of socio-economic development. An analysis of the varying weight of these forces 
helps explain the trends in global development outlined earlier. 
Capital investment depends however upon the availability of savings. Throughout most 
of human history savings were insufficient. Some 250 years ago, in the North Sea area, this 
restriction was lifted in a sustained manner. The ways in which it was subsequently lifted in 
other parts of the world varied, contributing to different pathways to development.  
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Figure 8 Real GDP and wages in England, 1270-1850. Source: data from Allen at 
www.iisg.nl/hpw; https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/People/sites/Allen/SitePages/Biography.aspx 
 
In pre-industrial societies average income was close to subsistence levels, and traditional 
institutions and social relations (Asian values) restricted inequality. Significant inequality 
(beyond a small ruling elite) was incompatible with the survival of the population. As a result, 
there was little scope to raise savings rates. North Sea economies overcame this constraint by 
destroying traditional institutions and establishing social relations of capitalist production 
(private property, a wage earning class separated from the means of production, capitalist 
agriculture, and merchant capitalist structures) and international divisions of labour. As a result 
income inequality increased, allowing for the redistribution of income in favour of savings and 
investment (Popov, 2014). 
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In 1500-1800 throughout Europe there was a secular decline in real wages. In the North 
Sea area, however, there was a secular increase in GDP (see Figure 8 for the English case). As 
GDP increased, middle and upper class incomes increased (Saito, 2015), at the expense of 
greater inequality and depression of the real living standards of wage earners, but without driving 
wage earners beneath the subsistence minimum or over-turning the system Increased upper and 
middle class incomes enabled savings and investment to increase. 
Figure 9 Real wages in Amsterdam, Beijing, London and Milan, 1730-1910 Source: data 
from Allen at www.iisg.nl/hpw; 
https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/People/sites/Allen/SitePages/Biography.aspx 
 
Capitalism is founded on inequality. In the Netherlands and England the fact that wages 
were several multiples of subsistence permitted a compression of real living standards. As Figure 
10 shows, real wages in London and Amsterdam fell from the early stages of industrialization 
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until 1812 and 1863 respectively, but were considerably higher than in Milan and Beijing 
enabling these areas to pull cumulatively away from the ROW. 
In Japan the first phase of industrialization occurred in the era of late nineteenth century 
globalization after the Meiji restoration of imperial rule. At that time Japan was a relatively 
egalitarian society. Growth, however, was accompanied by a strong rise in inequality, as is 
expected as rural societies are initially transformed into urban/industrial societies (Kuznets, 
1955). In Japan however development combined modern industry with a traditional, non-
proletarianized agriculture (combining/articulating several modes of production). Although 
powerful landlords emerged, rural society predominantly comprised small rural cultivating 
landlords and tenant cultivators supplementing labour and land-intensive farm-work with proto-
industrial and off-farm occupations (Saito, 2015). 
Figure 10 Gross capital formation as a share of GDP. Source: elaborated from World 
Bank (2016) and The Conference Board (2015) 
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Countries that industrialised later pursued different paths (Gerschenkron, 1962), and 
these paths involved different institutional and real wage evolutions. Centrally planned 
economies in Eastern Europe and China mobilised domestic savings for investment without high 
inequalities and started to catch up. After the Second World War, a slow increase in income and 
considerable US support enabled Japan and the Asian Tigers to increase savings rates and 
investment and achieve sustained economic growth, with degrees of inequality that were 
significantly smaller than in Europe and Latin America, and without a reduction in real living 
standards. China more recently embarked on a transformation which saw inequality increase but 
the real incomes and consumption of almost all sections of the population rise and millions lifted 
out of poverty, contrasting sharply with the experience of the first countries to industrialise. As 
in other Asian countries, however, the speed and sustained character of growth derive from 
exceptionally high rates of saving, investment and capital accumulation (Figure 10). 
6 Political multiplicity, governance capacity and equalization and differentiation of 
the conditions of production, consumption, distribution and exchange 
These contrasting ways in which income distribution, savings and investment influenced 
growth are just one aspect of the institutional/political mediation of capital accumulation. The 
world is divided into a multiplicity of states with different institutional/civilizational/social 
configurations. These configurations evolve in the light of national reforms/revolutions and the 
internalization of international influences. These states themselves adopt development strategies 
that serve to increase and reduce disparities. At each point in time these states also function as 
differentially endowed centres of development. Japan, for example, has acted as an important 
driver of combined development in Asia. China is emerging as a driver of combined 
development in Eurasia, and, through development co-operation and investment, in Africa. 
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In a world of multiple polities developed states competitively/collaboratively and 
individually/collectively assert their dominance over other countries. Countries that are less 
developed are enmeshed in asymmetric webs of economic, political and military dependence that 
can impede/enhance their growth and development. 100 years of humiliation from the first 
Opium War to 1949 saw China, for example, go backwards economically to become the poorest 
country in the world. After the Second World War the US supported the development of its allies 
in East Asia and Western Europe. 
Contender countries sought to close development gaps. Commercial and military rivalries 
played a part in the nineteenth and early twentieth century growth of European economies and 
the initial rise of Japan. In the second-half of the twentieth century East Asian contender 
countries aided by the US caught up quickly. To counter relative under-development, contender 
countries usually start with import substitution policies that see newly created industries crowd 
out foreign goods from the domestic market. At an appropriate point, emerging countries must 
switch to export orientation. Countries/regions that have established some domestic nodes of 
industrialization positioned in the early stages of development nonetheless find the challenge to 
grow from their initial positions extremely difficult. Industrial investment often depends on 
incoming transnational corporations that are very resistant to domestic content and technology 
transfer requirements and use their influence with international organizations and their domestic 
governments to unravel policy restrictions. 
State-directed development of the productive forces is a driver of combined development, 
designed to jump steps and move progressively in the direction of a relationship of similarity 
with more developed economies by grafting on aspects of modernity. The aim is not to accept an 
about-to-be-established relationship of complementarity, involving sustained occupation of a 
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subordinate position in an international capitalist division of labour that reproduces unevenness 
(Desai, 2015; Rolf, 2015).  
An ability to overcome the aforementioned constraints and move in the direction of 
similarity depends in part on the strength of national identify, state domestic and international 
governance capacity, underlying social relationships/capability (Abramovitz, 1986) and the 
international context including relations among states. Of these determinations, state capacity 
depends on state strength and scope. State strength denotes the capacity of a government to 
enforce laws cleanly and transparently, implement effective policies and ensure compliance with 
the state’s monopoly of violence and economic regulation, State scope denotes the range of 
functions that a government can effectively accomplish (Popov, 2014).  
Great Britain’s rise involved the use of protectionism and free trade policies along with 
the resources and markets of its empire to promote industrialization. The development of 
contender countries such as the US, Germany and Japan all involved state-supported capitalist 
industrialization and catch-up: the US used tariffs, import controls, subsidies, tax exemptions and 
state investment in infrastructure. The initial development of the Soviet Union and China 
involved state planned socialist models. The catch-up of western and southern Europe was 
shaped by varied systems of governance that often involved significant state 
investment/intervention. East Asian catch-up was shaped by a variety of developmental states 
that mobilised domestic and international financial resources and supported strategic industries. 
In none of these cases did development occur in the context of a minimalist multi-party 
representative state. 
These cases are studied in terms of the rise and decline of nations/regions or the rise and 
decline of institutions: in Trotsky’s theory of U&CD these questions are combined (van der 
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Linden, 2007). An implication is that, alongside economic mechanisms, national institutions and 
the strength and capacity of states play an important role in driving catch-up 
industrialization/combined development. Popov (2014) has argued that state capacity depends on 
historical evolutions and in particular on the impact of colonization (combination) on traditional 
community structures. State capacity was/is strong where traditional institutions were completely 
destroyed and replaced by Western institutions in white settler countries (except South Africa), 
weak where they were destroyed but only partially replaced in Latin America, sub-Saharan 
Africa and to a lesser extent South Asia, and strong where they (Asian values) survived as in 
parts of East Asia. Consequent differences in institutional conditions and economic inequality 
played a central role in explaining catch-up industrialization. 
As Trotsky argued, economic and cultural capacities of adaptation and assimilation have 
performed an important role in determining the extent to which latecomers take advantage of the 
privilege of backwardness to appropriate what is relatively advanced (through investment, 
learning and acquisition), avoid steps on the path (through stage skipping investment), create 
combinations with a higher preponderance of modern elements and generate these effects 
quickly and strongly (Figure 5). The mirror image of the privilege of backwardness is the 
handicap of a head start. If a head start results in rigidities that impede progress as, for example, 
by restricting the scrapping of old and investment in new assets that are possibly interdependent 
and under the (uncoordinated) control of different owners, a relative latecomer leap forward is 
more likely (van der Linden, 2007). 
Cases of latecomer advantage in contemporary China reflect both a privilege of 
backwardness for China and a handicap of a head start for more developed areas. China’s rail 
system was largely developed after the Second World War. China’s rolling stock was 
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predominantly steam-driven until the 1980s, In the new millennium, however, China acquired all 
the patents worldwide for trains capable of exceeding 250 km/h, and in 2003-15 constructed a 
20, 000 km high-speed rail system. China had great difficulty in establishing a wired telephone 
network, yet was able to jump into the era of wireless and digital communication. Although 
western countries and South Korea were at the forefront of third generation cell phone 
technologies, China was an early player in fourth and fifth generation technologies. Chinese 
financial institutions still use large amounts of paper, yet internet banking has developed at an 
extraordinary speed. In the absence of a high-quality incumbent legacy retail system at all levels 
of the urban system, online shopping has taken off explosively and is highly innovative. 
Catch-up and overtaking depend however on governance and economic and cultural 
capacities of adaptation and assimilation, making the attention paid in regional and urban 
development studies to institutional variety and performance increasingly vital. Attention has 
been paid to varieties of capitalism, variegated governance (J. Peck & Theodore, 2007) and 
varieties of ‘plan rational’ developmental states (Haggard, 2015). 
Although identification of these types contributes to causal accounts of comparative 
development and critiques of more generalized models, these categories do not capture the 
diversity, multiplicity and particularity of social configurations and development pathways. In an 
unevenly developed world, the diffusion of ideas, knowledge and values and the imperatives of  
geo-political and geo-economic competition result in interaction and in reproduction in each and 
every territory/polity of a unique variety of social structures.2 In these interacting multi-scalar 
                                                 
2 China for example has combined inherited and imported elements in new ways to mix 
state-owned enterprises, solely-owned direct foreign investment, joint ventures, township and 
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contexts, joint transformations of social structures and institutions are designed to move forward 
while dealing with contradictions, generating as many development paths as there are places. 
7 Conclusions 
The theory of U&CD emphasizes the ways in which the evolution of a world made up of 
differentiated societies/polities depends not just on their internal structures and agents but also 
mechanisms deriving from their interconnectedness/combination. In a world of societies in 
which the capitalist mode of production predominates, mechanisms that constantly create new 
forms of unevenness coexist with mechanisms that equalise development. These mechanisms are 
economic and political. Economic mechanisms derive from competition, the accumulation of 
capital, the expansion of demand and institutional adaptation. Political mechanisms derive from 
political multiplicity and depend on whether relationships are competitive or collaborative and 
on governance capacity. Acting at multiple geographical scales and changing over the course of 
time, the relative weight of mechanisms of differentiation and equalization drive comparative 
development, while the combination of inherited conditions with whatever is in advance at any 
point in time gives rise to complex articulations of modern and non-modern modes of production 
and ways of life and multi-linear development. 
                                                 
village enterprises, private enterprises, a rural household responsibility system, state/collective 
ownership of land, massive public assets, a unified state with strong political decentralization 
and fierce inter-jurisdictional competition, elite consultative democracy, a cadre responsibility 
system, a combination of Confucian, socialist and consumerist values and a distinctive model of 
international relations, amongst others. 
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In this article this concept of U&CD was elaborated to provide an interpretation of the 
Little and Great Divergences (section 2) and of macro-geographies of catch-up industrial and 
urban development. Considerable attention was paid to (1) differential capital accumulation, (2) 
the impact of income distribution on the availability of savings to finance infrastructure, acquire 
capital goods and develop/acquire and exploit human knowledge and capabilities and (3) the 
political capacity to implement catch-up development. 
Uneven development is a central concept in urban and regional research. A weakness of 
this concept compared with U&CD is that it pays insufficient attention to 
interactivity/connectivity and political multiplicity. U&CD combines the analysis of dynamic 
change over historical time and comparative differences across geographical space (J. 
Rosenberg, 2006). U&CD embraces the analysis of multi-scalar and historical processes of 
capital accumulation and the associated movements of money, people, goods, income and wealth 
that serve to widen/reduce disparities of all kinds. U&CD involves a conception of the global 
system as a constellation of interacting, national institutional configurations and interests that 
shape economic trends in part through state development strategies. The asymmetric integration 
and interaction of national models of development and the way they interact with global 
processes modifies their internal dynamics and generates international/sub-national disequilibria. 
These ideas have much to contribute to urban and regional research and its relationships 
with cognate disciplines. More specifically, U&CD provides a powerful overarching framework 
for the analysis of urban and regional dynamics: the specific socially-mediated processes of 
catching-up, falling-behind, overtaking and surging-ahead that generate geographical variety and 
comparative regional/urban evolutions. This framework requires, however, further specification 
of the underlying causal drivers and repercussions of the concentration of infrastructures, jobs, 
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people, income and wealth in hierarchical systems of interconnected city regions. The extant 
literature already contains numerous insights as does research in cognate disciplines, although 
analysis must deal not with generic (indeterminate) categories/mechanisms but with the forms 
they assume in different institutional and social contexts. 
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